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Abstract
Electric power grid infrastructure has revolutionized our world and changed the way of
living. So has blockchain technology. The hierarchical electric power grid has been
shifting from a centralized structure to a decentralized structure to achieve higher flex-
ibility and stability, and blockchain technology has been widely adopted in the energy
sector to deal with grid management, billing, metering, and so on, because of its nature of
decentralization. Here, the aim is to provide a multi‐dimensional review on the techno-
logical advances of the blockchain in smart grids. Its corresponding applications based on
these advances, including company projects and use cases, are summarized. Furthermore,
the security threat issues in smart grids, Ethereum Virtual Machine (i.e. the operating
environment of consensus mechanisms), and smart contracts are analysed, with a brief
conclusion to manifest the prior tasks in building secure blockchain‐based infrastructures
in smart grids. As such, the challenges and features of different protocols and their
applicability in each use case are identified to provide an insightful guide for future
research studies.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Traditional power grids are generally used to carry power
from central generators to a large number of customers.
According to some literature studies, the characteristics of
this power network mode are summarized as follows [1, 2].
Firstly, the high distribution loss is caused by long distance
transmission. Secondly, distribution stations must be built,
and there are high civil and installation costs. The risk rate
of large‐scale power supply accidents is high due to the use
of integrated power supply. It is difficult to control and
monitor regional power quality and performance. At pre-
sent, thermal power generation is still widely used, which
brings more environmental problems. In addition, its in-
formation services are lagging behind the needs of our
times. The traditional power network is a rigid system. The
access and exit of power supply and the transmission of
electric energy are inelastic, which leads to the lack of
dynamic flexibility and grouping of the power network. The
vertical multilevel control mechanism is slow to respond
and cannot build real‐time, configurable and reconfigurable
systems. The self‐healing and self‐recovery capability of the
system is completely dependent on entity redundancy. There
are many information islands in the system which lack
information sharing. Although the degree of local automa-
tion is constantly improving, due to the imperfection of
information and due to weak sharing ability, the multiple
automation systems in the system are fragmented, local and
isolated, and unable to form a real‐time organic unified
whole, so the intelligence degree of the entire power grid is
low.
In contrast, Smart Grid (SG) uses two‐way flows of elec-
tricity and information to create an automated and distributed
advanced energy delivery network, which is expected to be the
next‐generation power grid [3]. SG utilizes modern informa-
tion technologies and computational intelligence in an inte-
grated version to deliver power, which is characterized by self‐
monitoring, adaptive recovery and distributed generation. The
new features of smart grid technology can be concluded as
follows:
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� Two‐way flow: Through the use of electromechanical
components, conventional grid transfers electricity and the
information goes from power generating units and utilities
to consumers in a single direction way. In a smart grid, it
adopts Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
to allow two‐way communication flow, and the electricity
can be delivered bidirectionally [3].
� Distributed energy resources: Smart grid utilizes micro‐
sources such as renewable energy to form a microgrid to
support distributed energy systems; however, the traditional
grid system is centralized where generation and distribution
are hierarchical.
By utilizing micro‐sources, SG can control and optimize
electricity demands of local areas in a more economical and
reliable way. The distributed generation promotes the devel-
opment of new grid paradigms, which benefits from smart
energy subsystem technologies. Storage systems can be used in
virtual power plants or nearby loads. The storage system
comprises the distributed electricity generators (including
renewable energy from the wind, sun, tide and so on) and fast
response devices including batteries and EVs, which add
flexibility to the control of the microgrid. By storing energy at
times of excess power and generating electricity at times of low
generation, the microgrid system is capable of accommodating
the power demand profile fluctuation. Furthermore, the char-
acteristics of different storage devices can be utilized to tune
the frequent and rapid power changes in renewable resources,
which brings economic advantages for the microgrid as well as
improves the power quality. The technological advances in the
smart grid can be categorized into four groups including power
and energy technologies, power system capacity, power system
performance, and end‐user integration [4].
In the process of energy decentralization and digitalization
from a traditional hierarchical grid network to a smart grid, the
main challenge is to explore the most suitable control paradigm
and distributed technologies. Blockchain is a shared decen-
tralized ledger that can support permissioned or permissionless
user participation, which provides scalability, security, redun-
dancy and adaptable applications [5]. The inherent nature and
recent development of blockchain technology have made it a
promising solution for energy grid advancement. Furthermore,
compared with conventional SG that fully depends on the
redundancy of each entity to ensure system reliability, block-
chain can utilize distributed ledger technology (DLT) and
consensus mechanisms that can be continuously replicated on
all or at least a group of nodes in a blockchain network to avoid
a single point of failure. Despite the assistance from blockchain
technology, the transformation from the traditional grid
structure to the smart grid still faces huge workloads from the
infrastructure design, installation and requirements from
various stakeholders. The challenges of the smart grid system
based on the analysis of current applications are addressed as
follows:
1. Integration: The massive distributed energy resources such
as solar panels and wind turbines need to be integrated into
the smart grid system where power generation is interme-
diate and unpredictable. The interactions between the
distributed resources and grid operators are highly random
with different control standards and protocols so that an
automated control system is required to accommodate
more types of decentralized participants.
2. Scalability: As mentioned above, the rise in the number of
participants will increase the number of transactions. The
latency will increase with higher user participation. And
there is inherent latency of the system response time for
communication, power delivery and settlement, which
serves the system's scalability [6].
3. Security: Security concern has two aspects, data privacy and
the vulnerabilities and mitigations in both blockchain and
smart grids. The transaction data in a traditional grid system
is exposed to various attacks which can be inferred from a
user's identity and activity patterns [7]. Moreover, smart grid
systems that utilize advanced ICT protocols can be
compromised or eavesdropped due to fake or malicious
data attacks in the network [8].
In this regard, this paper presents a comprehensive review
of the blockchain technology solution to smart grid trans-
formation from the point of technological advances in its in-
dustrial applications and, finally, the challenges and
opportunities. Various use cases of blockchain applications in
the energy sector demonstrate that blockchain technology will
be a game changer in the future. Furthermore, the discussed
challenges involve not only the security concerns in blockchain
itself but also the threats and safeguards to smart grids that will
act as holistic lessons for advancing the combination of
blockchain and smart grids in future. Compared with the
surveys [9, 10] that do not involve the security concerns related
to blockchain‐enabled smart grids or only show some high‐
level security concepts, the strength of our survey is to pro-
vide in depth security discussions on both blockchain and
smart grids. Meanwhile, compared with two other surveys
[11, 12] that only focus on the security and privacy of block-
chain, this work also presents the challenges and counter-
measures from the perspective of smart grids to offer a
broader view of security and privacy for different researchers
in the fields of blockchain and smart grids. Our contributions
focus on technological insight to evaluate the novelty and
feasibility of blockchain technology:
1. This work provides an in‐depth understanding of the ad-
vances in blockchain technology in the smart grid. We
present a comprehensive state‐of‐the‐art solution from a
technical perspective which includes consensus mechanisms
and smart contracts, and SG operational side, including
energy infrastructure and markets.
2. Based on the technological advances, the blockchain‐
enabled energy sector applications with prospective fields
are identified from current pilot projects and trials. A sys-
tematic review of the current use cases is provided according
to the consensus mechanism type, which emphasizes on the
energy system infrastructure design for different scenarios.
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3. By analysing the security issues in the smart contract and
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), which are two funda-
mental entities for storing and running consensus mecha-
nisms applied in the energy sector, we conclude the primary
missions to develop a more secure running environment for
consensus mechanisms in future.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides an overview of blockchain technology including ter-
minologies and technologies. In Section 3, blockchain tech-
nology in smart grids is presented with key elements and
advances. Section 4 reviews state‐of‐the‐art real use cases from
pilot projects based on consensus mechanism applications.
Section 5 presents a security threat analysis and the challenges
exposed in the smart grid and blockchains, and Section 6
provides the conclusion and the scope of future work. A list of
abbreviations is also included in Table 1.
2 | OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN
TECHNOLOGY
Blockchain technology is primarily known from crypto-
currency applications which are viewed as the first stage
blockchain. However, blockchain technology is envisaged to
have the capacity to reform financial markets, supply chains
and business‐to‐business services [21]:
• Digital securities trading: proof of ownership for asset
registries and title transfer of hard assets to secure
recording of intangible assets [22].
• Foreign exchange: executes currency exchange and
conversions such as Coinbase (wallet) and Kraken [23].
• Digital identity: protects the privacy of consumers by
providing an immutable digital identity for users.
• Supply chain: improves transparency in supply chain
records with the certification of manufactured products or
diamonds certification [24].
The variety of proposed applications expect blockchain
technology to bring significant process optimization and novel
business models. The potential lies in the DLT which can
redefine digital trust and remove intermediaries which disrupt
traditional forms of hierarchical governance. The disruptive
nature of blockchain technology is able to use consensus
within the network to enable an open‐source and transparent
community to support decision‐making and system running.
2.1 | Blockchain deployment
Blockchain is a shared and trusted DLT that permits the
recording of any digital asset transaction between parties over a
decentralized network, which is initially developed as a mech-
anism to record financial transaction [25]. Bitcoin is known as
the first blockchain application, and the technology is contin-
uously evolving [26]. The advanced features of blockchain are a
genuine combination of several techniques including distrib-
uted computing, cryptography, peer‐to‐peer (P2P) communi-
cation and game theory, where technological and economic
primitives are elegantly considered [27]. Data integrity is
guaranteed via the nature of the distributed feature, and the
encryption system that uses public and private keys offers users
the ability to sign transactions [28].
Blockchain can also be classified as the parent chain and
side chain according to the relationship between chains. The
comparison between different types of blockchain is demon-
strated in the Table 2.
• In a public blockchain, there are no access restrictions
for any participant. The transactions on the blockchain are
available for checking and all peers are allowed to make
transactions. Typical applications include Bitcoin and
Ethereum. A public blockchain is used in cryptocurrency,
e‐commerce, Internet banking, etc. [29].
• In a consortium blockchain, update operations are only
allowed for its consortium members. Only the selected set
of nodes are responsible for executing the consensus
mechanism in the network. It is generally suitable for
making payments, accounting and auditing between banks
where one block can be globally confirmed after confir-
mation from two‐thirds of the nodes.
• A private blockchain is applied in private organizations
for database management and auditing. The value of pri-
vate blockchain is that it provides a secure, trackable,
immutable and automated platform [28].
2.2 | Blockchain operations
A complete blockchain system is composed of complex tech-
nologies, for example, digital signature and time stamps for
data storage, consensus mechanisms in the P2P network,
mining and PoW, bitcoin wallet for an anonymous transaction
technique, Merkle tree for data structure, and so on [30]. It is
because of the aforementioned technologies that the block-
chain system is constantly transacting, validating and
T A B L E 1 A list of common abbreviations
Smart Grid SG
Electric vehicle EV
The Internet of Things IoT
Information and Communication Technology ICT
Environment Virtual Machine EVM
Peer‐to‐peer P2P
Proof of Work PoW
Proof of Stake PoS
Byzantine Fault Tolerance BFT
Proof of Authority PoA
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expanding. The fundamental components of blockchain tech-
nology are shown below:
• Data block: Transactions are stored in the data block
where the block generation rate is roughly 10 min for each
block, and each data block contains a header and body.
The header encapsulates the version, previous block
address, timestamp, nonce, Merkel root, etc., and the body
contains the transaction counts and details [31]. Each
transaction is permanently stored in the data block and
available for checking by anyone. And the Merkle tree in
the block body applies a digital signature to each trans-
action so as to ensure that the transactions are not
repeated or forged [32].
• Mining and forks: Mining is the process of searching a
random number (nonce) which makes the hash value
satisfy the requirement for gaining the right block selec-
tion [33]. The newly generated block will be broadcast
immediately for validation in case of fraud, and the blocks
can be traced back through the hash value. However, there
will be forks when two miners successfully mine two
blocks at almost the same time. After forking, the system
will continue mining and choose the parent chain by
calculating the maximum proof‐of‐work where the fork
chain will be abandoned [34]. It has also been noted that
some mining techniques require huge energy consumption
to compute, which can have significant social and eco-
nomic impacts [35].
• Timestamps: In the blockchain system, the node needs
to add the time stamp when generating a new block to
record the block write time. The following block will add
an approved time stamp to certify the previous block,
which forms a long‐term increasing time chain. The
timestamp is a significant parameter for the proof of ex-
istence, which ensures the immutability of the blockchain
system [36].
• Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO) [37]: UTXO is
the basic unit in the bitcoin transaction process. Except
for the genesis block, all transactions (Tx) in the block
contain the origin of the funds (TX_in) and the output of
the funds (Tx_out). Only the UTXO stored in the
network nodes with the digital signature can be transacted.
In this way, the system does not need to check its com-
plete transaction history to confirm its legitimacy.
• Hash function: The hash function codes the original
transaction data into a fixed‐length string, which is
composed of numbers and alphabets [38]. This process is
single directed so that the coded hash value cannot be
interpreted [39]. SHA 256 is the most commonly applied
hash function using the Merkle–Damgard function to
generate a 256‐bit hash value [40].
• P2P network [41]: P2P network is a distributed appli-
cation framework that is used to assign tasks and work-
loads between peers. A blockchain system is established
upon IP communication protocols and distributed net-
works. Each node in the peer network has equal rights
which do not exist in any centre point or hierarchical
structure.
2.3 | Blockchain smart contracts
With the complex design of smart contracts, it can be applied
to many areas such as database systems, financial derivative
services, etc. [42]. Generally speaking, a smart contract cannot
be intervened by human activities once it is successfully
T A B L E 2 Comparison among public blockchain, consortium blockchain and private blockchain






Centralized Decentralized Multi‐centred Centralized
Data transparency Public Private Private
Reward policy [13] Yes Optional No
Trust model Untrusted Semi‐trusted Trusted
Consensus mechanisms PoW, PoS, DPoS [14] BFT‐based (e.g. PBFT, RAFT [15]) BFT‐based (e.g. RAFT [16])
Large energy
consumption
Low energy consumption Low energy consumption
Finality [17] No Enabled Enabled




Transaction approval frequency Slow Medium Fast
Use cases Cryptocurrency [18] Payment, accounting [19] Auditing, database management (within the
organization) [20]
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deployed. The Ethereum is a blockchain platform supporting
smart contracts, and the advantages of smart contracts can be
concluded as follows:
• Real‐time updates: A smart contract supported system
responds in almost real‐time as it does not need an
intermediary or third‐party authentication, which largely
increases transaction efficiency.
• Accuracy: The execution of each contract term is pre‐
defined and under the program's control, where all out-
puts are accurate and predictable [43].
• Low human intervention: Once a smart contract is
deployed, the content of its contract cannot be revised by
any parties so that any fraud or dishonest behaviour is
punishable by the contract [44].
• Low operation cost: The system can achieve low‐cost
transactions by removing human involvement in trans-
action, enforcement and compliance costs [45].
Smart contracts are user‐defined programs that determine
the rules of writing on the ledger [46]. It is a computer pro-
tocol that is capable of self‐executing and self‐verifying
without human intervention once it is deployed on the
network [47]. In the technological aspect, smart contracts are
executable programs that make changes on the ledger and are
automatically triggered when being called or when a specific
requirement needs to be met.
Before deploying a smart contract, the contract terms and
logic flows are made with relevant standards. Then they are
recorded in computer language encoding legal constraints and
terms of agreements. A smart contract usually provides an
interface for human–contract interaction which complies with
the recorded logic and rules [48]. With the integration of
cryptographic technology, the interaction activities can be
authenticated to ensure that the contract is executed without
any collisions or fraudulent activities in the process [49]. For
example, the management of bank accounts can be viewed as a
set of smart contract applications. In the traditional banking
system, operations such as withdrawal and deposit need
authentication from a centralized bank, and the system cannot
run without the bank’s supervision. With the aid of smart
contracts, any operation can be programmed with strict logic
flows and the system runs by calling the smart contract. In
Figure 1, it depicts the logical workflow for the smart contracts
on the Ethereum platform. Users can define the smart con-
tracts using programming languages such as Solidity, Serpent
and Lisp Like Language, which need to be translated into the
EVM bytecodes [42]. Then the code is deployed on the
Ethereum nodes with the cost of GAS using the Ethereum
cryptocurrency for miners’ confirmation. After it is success-
fully deployed, users can obtain an address for the contract and
the interface. The Javascript API interface provided from
web3.js can be used for calling contracts and making in-
teractions [50].
As a complex combination of various technologies,
blockchain is an elegant design of computer science, tele-
communication, cryptography and economy. The core
technologies includes consensus mechanism, unlocking script
[51], Merkel proof [52], transaction rules [38], Recursive
Length Prefix [53], etc. In particular, this thesis focuses on the
following technologies:
1. A smart contract that resides on blockchain and allows the
automation of multi‐step processes to self‐execute the
distributed heavy workflows is envisaged in the energy in-
dustry and the Internet of things [54]. The use of a smart
contract in blockchain technology is driven by open‐source
agreements, which also provide the potential to balance
supply and demand in the transactional energy market. A
smart contract also provides insight into allowing the
automation of multi‐step processes to self‐execute the
distributed heavy workflows, which is envisaged in the en-
ergy industry and the Internet of things.
2. The consensus mechanism guarantees its robustness against
misbehaviour and against malicious participants and in-
centivizes participants to validate transactions [36]. Hence,
blockchain is a promising technology for broad business
sectors where transparency, trust and efficiency are needed as
it can help design and deploy a proper consensusmechanism.
2.4 | Consensus mechanisms
In a distributed system, multiple peers form a network cluster
through asynchronous communication where states need to be
replicated between different hosts to ensure consistency in all
the peers [55]. However, if any of the peers in the cluster
encounters attacks or failure, it might cause network conges-
tion and broadcast tampered messages in the network. Hence,
a fault‐tolerant protocol is needed in the unreliable
F I G U R E 1 The process of smart contract deployment and calling on
the Ethereum platform
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asynchronous network to ensure a consistent consensus
among all the peers.
As for the blockchain‐based distributed ledger, the pri-
mary concern is to realize the correctness and consistency of
the transaction data from different ledger nodes [56]. The
consensus mechanisms in blockchain are the mechanisms or
set of rules that enable all the full nodes to reach an agree-
ment or consensus over the order of transactions [57]. There
are many types of consensus mechanisms in different
blockchain applications or scenarios such as Proof of Work
(PoW), Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT), Proof of
Stake (PoS), RAFT, Proof of Authority (PoA), etc. After
converging of the blockchain consensus process, the final
confirmed block/order of transactions is referred to as the
consensus finality [58]. It is worth noting that Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAG) could be an alternative to the tradi-
tional blockchain technology and can be categorized as a
DLT [59]. It differs from blockchain in how transactions are
added to a network, and it aims to improve the existing
speed, scalability and cost issues of blockchain technology.
Furthermore, by addressing the energy consumption issue
generated from resource‐intensive designed mining protocols,
more studies have also explored the benefits of renewable
resources to mitigate those negative environmental external-
ities [60].
2.4.1 | Proof of Work
Bitcoin is one of the most widely used blockchain systems that
use PoW to solve the critical challenge of reaching consensus
among participants [18]. PoW requires participants to dedicate
computation time and energy towards work (mining), where
the processes of initiating this consensus mechanism are called
miners. Miners are required to solve a hash code crypto puzzle
before encapsulating the transactions into a new block [61].
The miners repeatedly select a nonce, which is the difficulty in
solving the puzzle to obtain a result lower than the threshold,
whereas the network peers fight using their computation
source. In this way, it is nearly impossible for a single attacker
to jeopardize the system by modifying the block and solving
the puzzle due to extensive computation. So the system can
only be controlled or attacked if someone gains 51% of the
total network hash power [62].
Undoubtedly, there is a huge waste of energy and it re-
quires a constant global effort. It is claimed that Bitcoin and
Ethereum burn over $1 million worth of electricity and hard-
ware costs per day for running the consensus mechanisms [63].
Moreover, in order to reduce the number of forks in the chain,
Bitcoin's PoW is designed to produce a new block in an
average of 10 min and the difficulty of mining a new block is
increasing. The PoW protocol has proved that it scales to a
large number of users for public use. However, transaction
rates and finality are comparatively low [64]. The recom-
mended waiting frame is six blocks before accepting a trans-
action, which makes it impossible for many applications such
as electricity trading [65].
2.4.2 | Byzantine Fault Tolerance
The origin of BFT algorithms is their work on Byzantine faults
which deal with unpredictable actions in computer networks
when encountering hardware breakdown, network congestion
or malicious attacks [15]. The problem concerns a set of
Byzantine generals to agree on a joint plan of action during the
war. Generals need to perform a joint action in coordination
with the different parts of an army to attack simultaneously;
however, the message can only be delivered by senders due to
the huge territory. The challenge is to ensure that loyal generals
reach a consensus on the plan of attack such that traitors
cannot disrupt the attack plan. It is proved that the attack plan
can be guaranteed if there are no more than one‐third traitors
in the system [57].
In the blockchain system, the PBFT algorithm enables a
system to reach consensus with a low overhead and proceed
transaction within a few network information exchanges that
work against up to one‐third of the attacks from participants
[66]. The PBFT algorithm uses primary and secondary
replicas where the secondary replicas check the correctness
and liveness of the primary ones so that the complexity
decreases from exponential to polynomial [36]. PBFT en-
ables instant consensus finality as blocks are globally verified.
The problem of consensus is that participants of the
distributed system must agree on and accept a single shared
state [67]. It requires the network to have global knowledge
of the participants and does not scale the number of
participants.
2.4.3 | Proof of Stake
To address the energy consumption waste in the PoW
consensus mechanism, various alternative consensus mech-
anisms have been proposed, such as the PoS mechanism
[68]. The approach aims to replace the useless work of
solving puzzles by selecting a leader for deciding the next
block according to their stake shares. The probability of
generating a block depends on the stake of the nodes in
the system, which can result in less electricity consumption
and a decreased 51% attack probability [17]. In the case of
the few rich stake owners performing malicious attacks, PoS
can make use of game theory mechanisms to prevent col-
lusions and centralization by penalizing dishonest
behaviours.
Moreover, the maximum transaction rate is a few hun-
dred transactions per second, which is low compared with
other consensus mechanisms or visa system [29]. The PoS
protocol results in a lack of consensus finality and leads to
frequent blockchain forks. Even though it is making energy
consumption less wasteful, it still requires a fair amount of
available computation resources. However, PoS‐based algo-
rithms can be used in public blockchains and the validators
can be unknown when performing the consensus process
without knowing the identity ahead of time compared with
PBFT [57].
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2.4.4 | Proof of Authority
The PoA is designed based on PoS, which is adopted for some
private blockchains [69]. The protocol predetermines the au-
thority parities in the network, and each authority is assigned to
be the leader within a fixed time slot. Network members trust
the authorities and a block is accepted if it receives a majority
of approvals from authorized nodes. In this mechanism, it
needs to perform KYC to identify the authority ID and
background instead of the stake from PoS, where misconduct
or manipulation will be publicly revealed [70]. As PoA relies on
trusted authorities, it is only suitable for permissioned
networks.
3 | ADVANCES IN BLOCKCHAIN‐
ENABLED SMART GRIDS
Along with use cases and pilot projects in various sectors, the
potential of blockchain technology in the energy industry is
enormous, which is why it is deemed as a game changer.
Blockchain technology enables a trustless network to eliminate
the operational cost of participation of the intermediary
network and creates a means that is quicker, safer and cheaper
in the transactional energy market. According to commercial
reports from Deloitte [71] and PWC [72], blockchain has the
capability to disrupt energy‐related products and commodities
which can be traded interoperably as digital assets.
3.1 | System upgrades overview
In Figure 2, it demonstrates the cornerstones of a blockchain‐
based energy system. Energy trading transactions are recorded
on a blockchain in a tamper‐proof way, and the energy is
delivered via the network (power grid). In general design,
transactions (consumer‐producer matching) can be affected by
smart contracts automatically or by operators in the system
manually. With the integration of digital and communication
technology, a full energy system with residential use can be
achieved along with smart metres, smart devices, sensors and
end interfaces. As depicted in the figure, there are some key
points with respect to blockchain technology:
1. Energy networks: The supply and demand are balanced via
smart contracts with the aid of balancing the market,
microgrids, virtual power plants, storage and so on [73].
2. Energy transactions: Transactions data is stored on the
blockchain using a decentralized mechanism, with parties
identifying themselves through their digital identities, for
example, in the context of energy storage, renewable energy,
electric mobility and energy trading [32].
3. Record storage: The storage for the ownership records,
including emission allowances, renewable energy certificates
and asset management, can be securely stored on the
blockchain [62].
4. Payment: The payment for transactional energy in the
blockchain‐enabled energy system does not limit to the fiat
currency but also cryptocurrencies, which increases the
efficiency and security of the trading process [14].
3.2 | Power sources
The energy system is undergoing a revolutionary reform which
is advanced by the ICT and distributed energy resources. One
of the main challenges is to decentralize and digitalize the
current grid system, where the nature of decentralization in
blockchain can be utilized in structures and operations of
smart grids. In [74], the transactional energy system refers to a
series of energy transactions for the delivery of a certain
F I G U R E 2 Cornerstones of a decentralized
energy transaction and supply system
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amount of energy commodities within a specified time frame
and location which can support the business of all parties
including generators and distributed system operators.
The concept of transactional energy provides an insight
into the treatment of electricity as a commodity in the market.
In the market, control mechanism can be applied to achieve
various objectives. Besides providing the wholesale market in
the conventional grid system, transactional energy provides a
vision to aid the coordination of retail customers by auto-
mating a large number of frequent batch transactions using a
blockchain‐enabled platform, therefore reducing the central-
ized features of the next‐generation grid system [75]. The in-
formation exchange is the same for a large generator,
distributed energy resource, renewable energy generators such
as wind and solar energy resources, EV, microgrid, energy
trader, broker, exchange, aggregator or system operator.
Transactions can be executed between retail and wholesale
markets, which equalizes the opportunity for all components.
Furthermore, the transactions must also account for the
transmission and distribution limits and other physical con-
straints on the grid. The power source is undergoing tremen-
dous improvement to transition into a more decentralized one,
where smart, local energy systems (SLES) are also well noted as
forms of local energy projects to provide solutions to system
integration and management [76]. The Prospering from the
Energy Revolution (PFER) program seeks to develop, test and
scale up SLES to deliver cleaner, cheaper and more resilient
energy, and the four selection criteria for PFER demonstration
projects could define SLES by outcomes rather than by con-
stituent elements [77].
3.3 | Blockchain infrastructure
With increasing interactions between the power grid and
electricity users, traditional blockchain infrastructure is no
longer sufficient to support a large transaction throughput or a
low response time. Consensus mechanism, one of the core
parts in the blockchain system, is responsible for the coordi-
nation and connection of its stakeholders. In order to build an
advanced smart grid application, it should be able to process
the electricity and information distribution in order to be more
efficient, decentralized, flexible, reliable and secure. In this
regard, the consensus mechanism’s advances in the blockchain
infrastructure are presented in this subsection.
3.3.1 | Proof of Burn
In the Proof of Burn (PoBr) protocol, instead of providing
proof of the work, the miner sends the coins to ‘burn’ in order to
gain the right to mine a new block [78]. The miner which burns a
larger amount of coin will get a greater chance of being selected
by the random selection process. In this way, PoBr protocol does
not require the huge hardware cost as PoW does; however, the
validation process depends on the willingness to burn coins,
which will cause unnecessary waste of resources [13].
3.3.2 | Proof of Elapsed Time
Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) is designed to address the high
power consumption (waste) and latency for transaction
confirmation in PoW‐based consensus mechanisms. It was first
developed by Intel's Sawtooth project [79]. The protocol aims
to replicate a random block generation process without
spending valuable resources as PoBr or computation power as
Bitcoin. By requesting a waiting time from a trusted function in
a general‐purpose processor, the miner node with the least
waiting time is selected to mine the next block. It randomly
distributes leadership election across the entire population of
validators; however, this approach is dependent on the envi-
ronment developed by Intel, where trust can only be guaran-
teed with a single authority [58].
3.3.3 | Enhanced Proof of Benefit
The Enhanced Proof of Benefit (ePoB) consensus mechanism
is designed to choose the winning block leadership in the EV
charging and discharging scenario [80]. The participants (EV)
in the consensus process are a tuple of 〈U, G, P, A〉, where U
is a set of public nodes to submit buy/sell electricity orders; G
is a set of gateway nodes, and P is a set of decentralized
network peers to execute the consensus process. All routines
with charging and discharging requirements execute the veri-
fication algorithm of the ePoB consensus mechanism, which
maintains and expands the blockchain. A benefit generating
algorithm is proposed to calculate the maximum benefit
number for the overall grid, where the benefit can be defined
by the objective function.
Table 3 presents the comparison between some main-
stream consensus mechanisms including PoW, BFT‐based,
PoS and ePoB. They are compared based on various char-
acteristics such as consensus finality, computation cost, vul-
nerabilities and so on. As inferred from the table, all
consensus mechanisms have their pros and cons. For
example, the PoW consensus mechanism performs excellently
in the aspects of security and fairness with high scalability;
however, the energy consumption with increasing industrial‐
scale mining process is critical. It is also notable that the
scalability of BFT‐based consensus mechanisms is low
because they require quite high communication overhead
between permissioned nodes such as Hyperledger Fabric,
which is based on PBFT [82]. On the other hand, the new
consensus mechanism PoS is more environmentally friendly;
however, it is less secure and fair compared with PoW.
Furthermore, different consensus mechanisms adapt to
different blockchain types, and the types of blockchain ap-
plications depend on use case scenarios. In order to adapt to
the frequent trading demands and consider the global power
network delivery quality in the energy sector, an adaptable
consensus mechanism is required. The advances on consensus
protocols support a more dynamic and robust energy grid
infrastructure to further innovate the whole industry including
electricity pricing, billing, planning and so on.
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3.4 | Customer interface
Blockchain technology has the potential to be applied to
various business processes and operations in the energy sys-
tem, where it can bring novel business models or applications
in the following areas:
• Tariff: A smart contract based energy system can
enhance the automation process in billing for both con-
sumers and distributed generators, where utility com-
panies may change their tariff and billing plan according to
the consumer energy profile, real‐time cost or individual
preferences [83, 84].
• Trading: A blockchain‐enabled grid system can trade
with distributed energy producers, which is completely
different from traditional wholesale market management
[85]. Commodity trading transactions, risk management
and energy trading strategies are being explored to
accommodate the new system [86, 87].
• Automation: By enabling P2P energy trading, blockchain
technology can integrate locally produced energy, which
increases energy self‐production and self‐consumption
[88]. The automation process also significantly improves
electricity trading and delivery efficiency, thus generating
more revenues [89].
• Smart grid management: The integrated energy system in
smart devices utilizes advanced communication and ma-
chine learning technologies to provide monitoring, con-
trolling and management services. Grid management can
not only offer additional services to end users but also
improve network performance [83, 90, 91].
• Security and authentication: The protection of trans-
actions and security is guaranteed via cryptographic
techniques, which safeguard user privacy and data
confidentiality and improves the auditing and regulatory
compliance [92].
According to the features of transactional energy, block-
chain technology matches the requirements of frequent and
large‐scale transactions, thus being widely adopted. By utilizing
a distributed ledger with smart contracts, locally generated
energy can be managed in a compliant way with PFER dem-
onstrations. In [93], a novel energy trading mechanism based
on blockchain technology is proposed to adopt the decen-
tralized and competitive environment of locally generated
electricity, but the blockchain here is only used as a database to
record transactions. In [94], the authors further evaluate the
economic features of market mechanism for local energy
trading. A comprehensive Internet of thing business model is
designed in [95] to enable P2P trade for paid data using
blockchain and smart contract. However, the trading model
does not perfectly adapt to energy sector trading to address
frequent transaction needs and consider the overall system
performance. In [96], a dynamic price incentive market
mechanism is proposed to balance the local renewable energy
production and support flexible demand. In [97], a blockchain‐
based trading platform is proposed to support the decentral-
ized energy market with distributed optimization and control.
In [98], a more sophisticated dynamic power network infra-
structure is proposed, which can advance the performance of
small‐scale generators and the overall capacity resilience of
grids.
A blockchain‐based energy trading model is proposed to
allow prosumers to trade energy in the grid, enabling pro-
duction companies to achieve autonomy in the blockchain
power trading platform, which can inject and draw energy into
the smart grid public blockchain trading platform [51].
Henceforth, blockchain has generated broad interests in the
T A B L E 3 Comparison between consensus mechanisms
PoW BFT‐based PoS ePoB
Consensus finality Probabilistic Instant Probabilistic Instant




Latency in Tx confirmation High (6 blocks
confirmation)
Low (high throughput) Low (as compared with PoW) Low (as compared
with PoW)
Prone to forks Yes No Yes No
Scalability High Low (latency increases exponentially) High High
Vulnerability (n denotes the
number of network peers)
Prone to 51%
attack
Vulnerable to faulty nodes > (n − 1)/3
∗Vulnerable to DoS attack
Prone to 51% attack ∗Prone to
collusion of rich stakeholders
vulnerable to faulty
nodes > n/2 − 1
Type of blockchains Permissionless Permissioned Permissionless and permissioned Permissionless
Hardware requirement No No No Vehicle‐embedded
environment
Use cases Bitcoin Hyperledger Cosmos, Bitshare (DPoS) PEBT system [81]
Abbreviations: BFT, Byzantine Fault Tolerance; DoS, Denial of Service; ePoB, Enhanced Proof of Benefit; PBFT, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance; PoS, Power of Stake; PoW, Power
of Work.
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energy trading sector, where all energy traders are peers in the
blockchain network.
4 | APPLICATIONS IN SMART GRIDS
Driven by the advances in blockchain technology, utility
companies and blockchain teams have explored the feasibility
of applying blockchain technology in the energy industry. The
authors in [99] concluded eight types of use cases and
wholesale, retail and P2P energy trading and cryptocurrencies,
tokens and investment accounting take the largest shares
among the eight types, accounting for 33% and 19% of the
total share, respectively. Mature consensus mechanisms such as
PoW and PoS have been applied in many blockchain projects;
however, traditional consensus mechanisms might not meet
the requirement of the system when combined with energy
generation and trading [100]. So the choice of consensus
mechanisms is highly correlated with use case which has
different requirements for throughput, scalability, latency, se-
curity and so on. In this section, we focus on consensus
mechanism uses in different energy grid projects and present
them according to the types of blockchain‐based applications
for different purposes.
4.1 | PoW‐based
PoW consensus mechanism has proven to be highly scalable
for public blockchain, where it is the most commonly used
consensus mechanism in applications [62]. The Bankymoon
project works with banks to provide blockchain services for
cryptocurrencies integrating into smart metres [101]. The
project uses smart contracts to execute regulation or policy
terms according to the application requirements, thereby
effectively reducing transaction latency. A smart metre is used
in water and electricity installation, where low‐latency trans-
action is essential and the automated transaction process can
achieve an approximate real‐time settlement for payments.
Bankymoon utilizes a smart contract feature on the Ethereum
platform to ensure scalability and latency at the same time.
Another PoW‐based project named PowerLedger aims at
trading P2P renewable energy resources with customers [102].
Blockchain is used to trace the authenticity of green energy,
where the trading transparency on the origins can be promised.
The solution eliminates the customers’ concern about the
energy sources, and all transactions are securely recorded on
the blockchain. The Australian startup Divvi also focuses on
renewable energy trading and ownership, which is also based
up Ethereum's smart contracts [103]. However, P2P trading
emphasizes more than the origin proof. Another important
aspect is matching the customer with renewable energy sup-
pliers or the commodity being traded in this process [87].
The Alliander group from the Netherlands uses a smart
metre on the blockchain platform to enable real‐time electricity
exchange between energy markets (retail and wholesale) and
residents [104]. Also, it is developing an EV charging and
discharging platform to support dynamic customer contracts.
In this way, the EV user can choose the energy supplier and
trade with potential renewable energy providers whose elec-
tricity sources and prices are transparent to customers [88].
Due to the different application scenarios, Alliander uses
multi‐chain solutions in different use cases, such as a private
blockchain solution which is used for P2P energy sharing
platform, and a public blockchain which is adopted for smart
metre transaction recordings. The e‐mobility application is
extremely popular as the EV is a highly dynamic energy source
that can charge and discharge electricity to the grid network.
PowerLedger and another startup named Everty are also
working on the construction of an electric vehicle charging
infrastructure. The purpose is to establish an electric vehicle
charging platform, giving electric vehicle users more autonomy
[102, 105]. As we can see from the PoW‐based energy use
cases, scalability and transaction settlement time are the two
major considerations for accommodating more users. How-
ever, the incentive mechanisms in the project (used to promote
users to contribute to and behave well in the project com-
munity) should also be considered equally as the aforemen-
tioned scalability and latency.
4.2 | PBFT‐based
If a certain amount of signatures is collected from the network
peers, a PBFT‐based consensus mechanism can provide instant
finality. However, the message overhead limits the scalability of
the network; hence it is mostly applied in the consortium
blockchain to deal with a limited number of participants.
SunChain from France aims to build an energy management
system to track, secure and certify energy exchanges on
blockchain‐based applications [106]. It uses consortium
blockchain to eliminate the mining process and perform
authentication between consumers and energy producers. The
Dutch company TenneT and the German blockchain company
Sonnen use residential battery to provide ancillary grid services
[107]. It is implemented through Hyperledger, an open‐source
platform for enterprise‐scale blockchain solutions [108], to
provide information to the grid network operator regarding the
current power availability and reservoir. TenneT is the first
power grid operator to launch a blockchain project on the
operator level, where the PBFT algorithm is suitable in an
application with fewer stakeholders [109].
PONTON is dedicated to the whole energy market with
blockchain technology [110]. PONTON works with energy
trading companies and utilities to develop a P2P wholesale
trading platform in the regional market’s Tendermin platform.
Moreover, it applies strategies to enable smart trading and
provide additional energy services such as power load
balancing [111]. The BFT‐based blockchain project in BTL
works with the largest utility company in Austria to trade en-
ergy on the blockchain platform, which approves a huge
reduction in operation cost and improves the efficiency of the
trading process [112]. The automation process executed by the
blockchain contracts reduces the time in the wholesale
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transaction, such as confirmation, authorization, audit, etc.
[113]. Now, the projects mentioned here, that are based on the
PBFT consensus mechanism, are working with large stake-
holders where the number of participants is limited. Also, the
identity of the network peers is known and visible to all par-
ticipants, thus the system’s security is ensured, whereas scal-
ability is still the biggest drawback for PBFT‐based consensus
mechanism.
Ripple is an open‐source payment PBT‐based agreement
on the Internet to achieve decentralized currency exchange,
payment and liquidation [14]. In the Ripple network, the
transaction is made by the application and broadcast via
tracking nodes or validating nodes. The consensus process of
Ripple is run between validating nodes where each node has a
pre‐configured copy of the Unique Node List (UNL), and only
the nodes from the UNL are capable of voting for the
approved transactions. The validating nodes will store the
approved transaction with 80% votes from UNL nodes to the
local ledger, which is referred to as the last closed ledger [114].
In the Ripple consensus algorithm, the identities of the voting
nodes from the UNL are known, so the transaction confir-
mation time is around several seconds, which is more efficient
than permissionless consensus mechanisms such as PoW.
Hence, the Ripple consensus mechanism is only suitable for
permissioned blockchain applications [28]. And the BFT
capability is n−15 , which guarantees a secure consensus process
withstanding 20% nodes performing Byzantine faults [115] (n
denotes the number of nodes in the network).
4.3 | PoA‐based
A PoA‐based consensus mechanism highly relies on KYC
techniques, since identity is the authentication proof and par-
ticipants only trust authorized nodes. The use case of PoA is
usually characterized by a high security‐oriented scenario where
it cannot put integrity and security at risk [58]. Grid Singularity
is a highly active member of a blockchain organization pro-
moting green energy generation and certification [101]. It aims
to provide smart grid management solutions to improve power
load balancing, automated transaction and audition, and grid
network reliability. Grid singularity is also a member of the
Energy Web Foundation (EWF), an open‐source platform, and
works with large corporations to launch and accelerate
blockchain use cases in the energy sector [116]. EWF is an
Ethereum‐based platform that uses a PoA consensus algo-
rithm to generate blocks, where the finality can be generated by
51% of the validators’ signatures. Another blockchain com-
pany named Wirepas works with the EWF and serves as an
IoT provider to connect the IoT devices to the blockchain
platform [117].
StromDAO is a German company that has established an
investment platform for renewable projects, through which
consumers can invest directly [118]. It focusses on energy grid
stakeholders at all levels and provides blockchain solutions that
conform to the traditional grid structure. The British startup
Green Running is currently developing a decentralized
platform to make P2P energy trading possible [119]. It pro-
poses a market model to serve as a broker between the energy
producers and local aggregators, and customers can conduct
energy transactions on the platform. Artificial intelligence is
used to predict power consumption and electricity price and
then help the P2P market price for its participants. PoA‐based
blockchain applications have a clear tendency for large‐scale
corporation use cases. However, the authority judgement ex-
poses the centralized governing body, which is opposed to the
decentralized idea behind blockchain technology.
4.4 | Others
SolarCoin is an open community project, which was registered
as a public benefit corporation in the USA in 2014 [120].
SolarCoin uses a reward mechanism for solar energy pro-
ducers. Energy producer use blockchain‐based digital tokens as
rewards to produce one SunCoin per million watt‐hours of
solar energy. This project aims to enable verifiably produced
solar energy with SolarCoin issued cryptocurrency and reduce
carbon emission globally [121]. It uses a free economic
incentive to increase the production and consumption of solar
energy, and rewards the production of solar energy through
additional electricity stimulus. SolarCoin's blockchain uses PoS
consensus mechanism on the public blockchain platform to
verify blocks which are claimed to be more environmentally
friendly. As opposed to Bitcoin, SolarCoin is granted for the
proof of energy production from the solar installation, rather
than the mining reward for contributing to computation po-
wer. And the PoS in the SolarCoin project is designed to use
less than 0.001% of the power of bitcoin on a similar scale
[122]. Another PoS‐based project is called Energo Labs, which
works on decentralized autonomous energy exchange [123]. It
utilizes the Quantum blockchain, a decentralized application
platform, to integrate smart metres and EV charging stations,
thus reducing energy waste compared to PoW [39].
Bouygues Immobilier & Stratumn developed a blockchain
project, which is used for the direct exchange of electricity
between renewable energy producers and customers, where
renewable energy is authenticated and verified through a
blockchain platform [124]. The proof of the process is the
consensus mechanism for the verification process of zero‐
knowledge proof. Due to the hierarchical order of trust to
be executed in this process, an obvious centralized organiza-
tion is exposed [125]. Another startup named Pylon Network
developed a decentralized electricity trading platform for
distributed energy resources and customers, using Pylon coins
to reward green energy generation. The consensus mechanism
is the Proof of Capacity, which is based on LiteCoin that
supports a lower energy cost than the PoW with a larger
throughput [126].
We can see that majority of the applications are still based
on traditional consensus mechanisms. The most common
distributed ledger platforms include Ethereum, Quantum,
Corda and Hyperledger Fabric, which feature in different
functionalities that can be applied in more diverse scenarios.
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However, more and more applications are adopting or
designing novel consensus mechanisms to accommodate their
application requirements. In summary, a general comparison of
the consensus mechanisms used by applications in the recent
times is shown in Table 4.
5 | SECURITY THREATS AND
CHALLENGES
It is claimed that blockchain technology is capable of accel-
erating the smart grid transformation process for decentralized
energy generation and trading [131]. The overall security of a
smart grid in the context of a smart city covers multiple factors
such as data, connectivity, physical hazards, etc., where a
comprehensive security framework was proposed in [132]. As
for the process of energy decentralization and digitalization,
the main challenge is to explore the most suitable control
paradigm and distributed technologies. In this subsection, it
explores the challenges imposed by the aforementioned pro-
jects and use cases.
According to the interoperability standard of smart grids
proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) [133], a conceptual model of smart grids is
shown in Figure 3. It is noticeable that the market domain and
the operation domain have the highest interoperability, as these
two domains can be connected to all the other six domains in
Figure 3. Therefore, the security threats in the market domain
may affect the normal operation of the smart grids and vice
versa. When the stakeholders plan to build up the blockchain‐
enabled electricity trading market in the smart grids, they
should consider the security threats in both the blockchain‐
enabled markets and the entire smart grids.
Hence, our analysis of the blockchain‐enabled smart grids'
security threats is twofold in this section. The first part shows
the common security threats in smart grids. Then, the security
threats in consensus mechanisms, EVM and smart contracts
are analysed in the second part. Finally, in the last part of this
section, we present the lessons learnt from our analysis as well
as some suggestions for future blockchain‐enabled smart grid
security enhancements.
5.1 | Smart grids
Current smart grids are usually controlled and operated using
ICT. Therefore, security is still one of the most important
considerations to protect the devices, communications and
services in smart grids. Next, we conclude eight prevalent se-
curity threats from [134–139] in smart grids.
5.1.1 | Central controller compromise
The central controller (the operations domain in Figure 3)
usually has the most sound security safeguard in a smart grid
since it is the brain that controls all the facilities and devices of
the whole smart grid to provide varied services to the users.
However, social engineering attacks can invade the central
controller and make it vulnerable. Social engineering attacks
T A B L E 4 Consensus mechanisms in energy projects
Company/project Consensus mechanism Platform
Bankymoon [101] PoW Ethereum
PowerLedger [102] PoW Ethereum
Alliander & Spectral Energy [104] PoW, Round Robin‐based MultiChain
Divvi [103] PoW Ethereum
Everty [105] PoW Ethereum
SunChain [106] PBFT Hyperledger fabric
TenneT & Sonnen [107] PBFT Hyperledger fabric
PONTON [110] PBFT Tendermin
BTL [112] BFT‐based Interbit
Wirepas [117] PoA Ethereum‐based
StromDAO [118] PoA Fury Network [127]
GridSingularity [101] PoA Ethereum‐based
GreenRunning [119] PoA Ethereum‐based
Bouygues Immobilier & Stratumn [124] Proof of Process [125] Proprietary [128]
Pylon Network [129] Proof of Capacity [126] LiteCoin [130]
SolarCoin [120] PoS LiteCoin‐based
Energo Labs [123] PoS Qtum [39]
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can help an attacker obtain access to the central controller
from certain nodes with weak security settings or from the
staff. For instance, the central computers of the power grid in
the United States and Ukrain were invaded and malwares were
implanted by external attackers using social engineering attacks
[140, 141]. These malwares can allow attackers to manipulate
the servers, databases, billing systems and so on, resulting in
severe corruption and privacy leakage.
5.1.2 | Intermediation compromise
In smart grids, all the communication between different de-
vices needs to pass through multiple intermediate nodes (multi‐
hop communications), for example, a user uploads the bills to
the central controller via several collector nodes. Meanwhile,
some service facilities (e.g. charging piles) should use router
nodes to communicate with their controllers. If the interme-
diate nodes are compromised in a smart grid, plenty of sensi-
tive information can be leaked, including control commands,
event and device identifiers, users' power consumption (usage)
and so on, which will infringe user privacy and even support
other potential attacks indirectly. For example, users' behav-
iours and life patterns can be analysed from their power usage
[142]. Malicious code can be injected into metres through
modified software update by attackers [143]. In addition, legal
identifiers can be utilized to forge authorized devices or even
credentials but smart grid networks cannot discover them.
Another example is a weak backhaul network. Backhaul
network is an IP‐based intermediate component for data (e.g.
bills and bidding price) aggregation and collection. In a
backhaul network, misconfigurations may lead to weak
authentication. Furthermore, IP packets can be easily eaves-
dropped and even tampered, since packet encryption is not
mandatory in the configuration. Therefore, the attacker can use
methods like sniffing, replaying, spoofing and tampering to
gather sensitive information and interfere users’ actions [136].
For example, the attacker can modify the packet destination to
make the user send bills to him/her. On the other hand, the
attacker can change the packet sequence to delay the user's
bidding [144, 145]. It is clear that a weak backhaul network may
lead to fatal service failure, financial loss and cause harm to
users' privacy.
5.1.3 | Intrusion by unknown nodes
This attackmeans that an attacker can implant several nodes (e.g.
forwarding nodes) in the multi‐hop network where the smart
grid is constructed. If the multi‐hop network lacks access
authentication, these unknown nodes can be invisible and uti-
lized to perform the following three kinds of man‐in‐the‐middle
(MITM) attacks:
• Packet analysis: The attacker can use the implanted
nodes to intercept the transported data and perform an
attack similar to the compromise analysis of the multi‐hop
network.
• Service disorder: The attacker can block the connections
between nodes or publish fake commands (to ending
nodes) to disrupt the normal services in the smart grid.
• Operational failure: The attacker intercepts electronic
infrastructure commands and then deliberately sends
(tampered) incorrect commands to these infrastructures to
trigger their fault alarms and even shut them down [146].
Such threats may lead to severe damage to the smart grid’s
availability.
Compared with the threat of intermediation compromise,
this threat is much more practical (lower cost) and concealed,
and if there is no well‐structured authentication strategy in the
smart grid, the attacker does not need to attack the nodes.
F I G U R E 3 A conceptual model of smart grids
defined in the smart grid standard of NIST [133]
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5.1.4 | Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) threat means that the attacker can
exploit vulnerabilities in different network layers to generate
a tremendous number of fake connections in a short period
of time, thereby reducing the operating performance of the
entire smart grid. DoS can be further categorized as
follows:
• Processor or memory exhaust: The attacker can utilize
buffer overflow or malicious resource‐exhausted applica-
tions to crash the device’s operating system, thus causing a
DoS in the device [147].
• Ending device compromise: If certain legal ending de-
vices are compromised, the attacker can exploit these
devices to repeatedly send useless packets (e.g. fake con-
trol signals) to other nodes (like zombie network) in the
smart grid, thus realizing flooding attacks. This kind of
DoS can decrease communication performance and drain
the devices’ energy in the smart grid [146].
• Forwarding and routing compromise: This attack is kind
of a further exploitation of the intermediation compro-
mise. When an attacker controls some forwarding nodes,
he/she can continuously forward the same packets to
degrade the data transmitting capability of the smart grid
or clogg packet confirmation through a large number of
trash packets, causing the data transmission to lose syn-
chronization. For example, if the attacker manipulates
certain routing nodes, he/she can find a non‐existent
address by broadcasting an address lookup message,
thus crashing the routing service and clogging the
network [148]. On the other hand, if the trusted third
party that the smart grid relies on is attacked, it may cause
a DoS in the smart grid since certain essential security
functions such as key distribution, identity validation, etc.
can be clogged. It implies that reliance on a fully trusted
third party in a smart grid environment reduces the
robustness of the smart grid and increases the mainte-
nance cost [149].
5.1.5 | Weak credential
Weak credential is a threat not only to the smart grid but also
to most of the information systems. In smart grids, weak
credentials involve not only fake or weak credentials and weak
passwords but also vulnerable authentications (e.g. unsafe
PPTP VPN links), lose authorization policies and so on that
can be used to enter devices and facility systems. Weak cre-
dentials enable the attacker to learn the network structure,
collect information, find the vulnerabilities of different nodes,
and plan the attack targets in the smart grid when they are
compromised. For example, in the attack on the Ukrainian
power grids, the perpetrators broke the weak VPN credentials
to access the industrial control system and then remotely shut
down the partial power plants via human machine
interface [141].
5.1.6 | Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is the most common threat to an individuals'
privacy and the system security in smart grids. As discussed in
Intermediation compromise and Intrusion by unknown
nodes, the attacker can intercept communication channels to
gather power usage, household power load, peak time period,
geolocation and other personal sensitive information, and
analyse users' daily routine and behaviours [150]. On the other
hand, eavesdropping is an effective approach for an attacker to
obtain useful information from the target smart grid. More-
over, the attacker can exploit the information to learn about
the smart grid, and find potential vulnerabilities to organize
targeted and perilous attacks.
5.1.7 | Privacy analysis
When we consider privacy leakage and analysis, one type of
privacy analysis is conducted by the external attacker, which is
what we discussed in the intermediation compromise. How-
ever, there is another potential threat of privacy analysis from
the internal nodes. Even though a user’s power usage and bills
are aggregated with certain privacy‐preserving aggregation
schemes before they are transmitted to the power supplier
(central controller), the aggregation nodes can still reveal the
user’s private data to the power supplier and other stakeholders
such as electric companies [151] because these aggregation
nodes are essentially managed by the central controller [143].
For example, a user’s private data can be utilized for repair,
maintenance, price adjustment or even precise advertisement,
but the user actually knows nothing.
5.2 | Blockchain
Since blockchain and different consensus mechanisms were
proposed, the security discussions about blockchain and
consensus mechanisms have never stopped. Meanwhile, more
and more consensus mechanisms are being implemented based
on Ethereum; thus the security of EVM is being considered to
ensure that consensus mechanisms and smart contracts can be
executed correctly. Furthermore, as the carrier of trade strategy
and the applied consensus mechanism, a smart contract has
security vulnerabilities that may lead to transaction chaos or
even real‐world economic loss (manipulated by attackers).
5.2.1 | Consensus mechanism
Collusion attack
The collision attack is the most common method which can be
used by attackers to attack different consensus mechanisms. To
be specific, if the attacker has more than 50% of the computing
power in the PoW‐based context, the attacker can manipulate
all the results of the consensus requests, thereby causing fatal
problems to the PoW network (e.g. selfish mining, cancelled
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transactions and double‐spending) [152]. On the other hand, if
the attacker can control over 50% of the validation nodes
selected by the consensus leader, the collusion attack may
occur in the PBFT‐related context. Compared with the PoW‐
based context, the PBFT‐based context can be more easily
affected by the collusion attack because the quantity of the
used validation nodes defined by different consensus mecha-
nisms that process each consensus request is much less than
50% of all the nodes in the PBFT‐based context. The simu-
lation result is shown in Figure 4, which is consistent with this
view as the consensus mechanisms PBFT and Ripple cannot
reach 100% consensus accuracy in handling a different number
of concurrent transactions. Note that we utilize OPNET to
conduct our simulations based on the idea and source code
from [153]. The number of the consensus nodes for validation
increases from 2000 to 18,000 with a step of 4000. In the PoW
(ePoB) network and the PBFT (Ripple) network, the propor-
tion of the unfaithful nodes is 13 and
1
5, respectively. Meanwhile,
incorrect concurrent transactions are generated randomly
during the simulation.
Sybil attack
Sybil attack means that one attacker claims a large number of
fake identities (nodes) and then attempts to influence the
voting result of the consensus mechanism in the consensus
network. If the identity authentication is not robust enough,
the Sybil attack will be widespread in peer‐to‐peer networks.
For the PoW consensus mechanism operating in the anony-
mous network, the method used to ensure whether each node
is valid involves checking whether the node owns a consider-
able amount of computing power. Meanwhile, PoW consensus
mechanism provides miners with an incentive to work honestly
but not to work in a way that will help avoid a Sybil attack.
However, if enough fake nodes are selected in the validator
group, the PBFT‐related consensus mechanism may be
affected by a Sybil attack, resulting in a higher probability.
Eclipse attack
In an eclipse attack, the attacker monopolizes all incoming and
outgoing connections of the victim, thus isolating the victim
from the rest of his or her peers in the network [154]. To be
specific, a node depends on n number of nodes selected by the
peer selection strategy to view its distributed ledger in a
decentralized network. However, if an attacker can force this
victim node to choose all the n number of nodes from the
malicious nodes manipulated by him, the attacker can eclipse
the original ledger of the victim node and replace the original
ledger with a tampered ledger. Figure 5 shows an example of
the eclipse attack, where the victim node cannot send/receive
correct ledgers to the decentralized network since the victim
can only choose the malicious nodes as peers. Compared with a
Sybil attack that affects the entire blockchain network, an
eclipse attack only attacks certain nodes more precisely, so the
attack cost of an eclipse attack is much lower. It indicates that
an eclipse attack is much easier to be performed in real‐world
blockchain‐enabled systems [155]. In order to detect an eclipse
attack, Xu et al. [156] proposed to utilize random forest
classification algorithms to separate the attack data packets in
terms of certain packet features (e.g. packet size, access fre-
quency, access time and so on). Furthermore, two major
countermeasures are proposed to mitigate an eclipse attack.
The first countermeasure is partial randomness, giving priority
to the old nodes with fresh outgoing connections in the peer
selection. The other countermeasure is to establish some
known and verified nodes’ outgoing connections to test the
neighbour nodes before they are selected as peers [154].
5.2.2 | EVM
EVM is a transaction‐based state machine that runs on a 256‐
bit stack to execute all the functions in a smart contract and
then implements the consensus mechanism [48]. Compared
with the VMs used for general computation like Java Virtual
Machine (JVM), Dalvik and ART in Android, the complexity
of EVM is relatively low as it only needs to execute smart
contracts deterministically and supports certain cryptographic
primitives [157]. Nevertheless, security is still a primary
concern in EVM since it is the last barrier to prevent malicious
smart contracts and flaw consensus mechanisms. On the other
hand, Ethereum is the most mainstream platform (or frame-
work) serving numerous cryptocurrency and non‐
cryptocurrency applications. If EVM itself has severe vulner-
abilities, attackers may endanger all Ethereum‐based platforms
to cause irreversible financial loss. Meanwhile, there are four
versions of EVM that are used base on different programming
languages: py‐evm (Python), js‐evm (JavaScript), geth (Golang)
and aleth (C++). This diversity increases the potential attack
range for attackers and the workload of security analysis for
security researchers. In the current research, the major
methods for discovering EVM vulnerabilities are symbolic
execution and fuzzing [158], and the explored vulnerabilities in
EVM are mainly related to memory management (e.g. stack
overflow and illegal memory access) and opcode [48, 159].
Apart from detecting vulnerabilities in EVM, some re-
searchers try to reinforce EVM via bytecode verification and
semantics analysis [44, 50, 160, 161]. The target of these two
methods is to eliminate unsafe bytecodes generated in different
smart contracts. Since EVM is now continuously maintained
and updated, new vulnerabilities in EVM may threaten all
consensus mechanisms and smart contracts implemented on
Ethereum. Therefore, the blockchain community should pay
close attention to EVM security. In addition, many other
studies are discussing the use of cryptographic methods (e.g.
zero‐knowledge proof, ring signature and multi‐party compu-
tation) to design more secure consensus mechanisms running
in EVM [51, 162].
5.2.3 | Smart contracts
A smart contract is an entity to carry the implemented
consensus mechanism and transaction strategy. Therefore, the
security of consensus mechanism is tightly linked to the
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security of smart contracts. In order to explore the potential
vulnerabilities in smart contracts, several projects have pro-
posed the construction of fuzzing tools based on heuristic
search, symbolic execution, control flow graph and data stream
analysis [46, 163–166]. The common vulnerabilities found in
thousands of real‐world smart contracts are summarized as
follows.
Leaking and suicidal
A smart contract is considered to have a leak vulnerability if it
leaks ether to attackers. Similarly, a smart contract is considered
suicidal if it can be killed by attackers [167]. Both of these
vulnerabilities are caused by inappropriate permission settings
(especially in some smart contract tests), which allow attackers
to invoke send() or selfdestruct() functions without any
restrictions.
Block status dependency
If the transaction of sending ether (or other critical operations)
relies on certain block status variables (e.g. timestamp, difficulty,
gas limit and so on), the smart contract can be vulnerable since
an attacker can construct transactions to achieve malicious be-
haviours by analysing the block status. Timestamp dependency
is an example. Every block has a timestamp in the blockchain to
record the time of the transaction. When the trigger conditions
of some critical operations in a smart contract depend on
timestamps, the timestamp can be exploited as a vulnerability. If
an attacker can manipulate the timestamps (e.g. change the local
system time), the timestamp‐dependent smart contracts may be
vulnerable.
Exception disorder
The reason for exception disorder is the inconsistency during
exception handling. When a smart contract A tries to invoke a
function f in another smart contract B, the function call may
fail and generate different exceptions. Normally, all the
transactions will be reverted in terms of the chain of nested
calls for f ∈ B. However, if there is at least one low‐level
function call (e.g. address.call() and address.send()) in the
chain, the transaction rollback will be terminated at the last
low‐level function call. Therefore, the rest of the transactions
cannot be reverted, and the exceptions cannot be propagated
to the caller A.
Re‐entrancy
In general, the status of the contract's account can be changed
after the invocation of some re‐entrant functions in a smart
contract is completed. However, many functions in smart
contracts are not designed to be re‐entrant functions. There-
fore, if a malicious smart contract invokes these functions in a
re‐entrant manner repeatedly, it may lead to ether theft. The
famous ‘DAO’ attack takes advantage of the re‐entrancy
vulnerability through the fallback function withdraw() to
steal about 60 million USD [168].
Gasless send
When the sender tries to send ether >0 to the recipient, the
fallback function in the recipient smart contract will be
invoked with a fixed gas stipend (2300) determined by the
EVM. However, if the gas consumption of the fallback
function is designed to be higher than the current gas bal-
ance of the sender in the recipient contract, the sender will
receive the exception ‘out of gas’. Therefore, if the exception
‘out of gas’ is not handled and broadcast appropriately, a
malicious sender can send ether to the recipient without
costing gas.
F I G U R E 5 An example of the eclipse attack
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Frozen ether (locking)
Some smart contracts are designed to invoke the functions of
other smart contracts to operate ether via delegatecall(). It
means that these smart contracts entirely depend on the related
functions of other smart contracts to manipulate ether, as there
is no actual ether manipulating function in these smart con-
tracts. When the smart contracts that provide ether manipu-
lating functions execute self‐destructive (suicide) operation, the
smart contracts with only delegated calls cannot send the ether
to others, so that all the ether is frozen. In November 2017, a
frozen ether bug resulted in the Parity Wallet users to
permanently lose an estimated $150 million in funds [169].
Dangerous delegatecall
The delegatecall opcode is designed for a caller smart contract
to invoke other library contracts. Specifically, the caller contract
can load the library contract’s code and execute it in the
context of the caller contract. Since the parameter of dele‐
gatecall is the address of a library contract, an attacker can
execute an arbitrary code in the caller contract by manipulating
the parameter (i.e. the library contract’s address) of delegate‐
call. This vulnerability has been exploited to result in $30
million loss in a multi‐signature wallet.1
5.3 | Lessons learnt
• Improving the administration of staff and facilities is an
important step to enhance the security of the smart grid.
There should be widespread awareness of information
security and it should be learnt by every staff working for
smart grids because these staff are the actual operators of
all the facilities in a smart grid. If the staff are compro-
mised by social engineering or activate certain malicious
applications unconsciously, any smart grid can be broken
easily, even if they are flawless. On the other hand, the
physical access control of the facilities and the firmware
security of the electronic devices should also be consid-
ered carefully. This is because some attackers may barge
into some smart grid facilities to implant malicious devices
for eavesdropping, jamming, data collection and so on.
Meanwhile, the vulnerabilities in the electronic devices’
firmware can be exploited by some attackers to interfere
the running of these devices or execute other attacks,
thereby destroying the entire smart grid.
• Pragmatic testbeds should be built for a study to evaluate
different security approaches with unified standards.
Table 5 presents diverse countermeasures to address the
threats discussed in the smart grids (Section 5.1). It is
noticeable that each kind of solution has its own security
goals and features. However, they have a common draw-
back: lack of practical evaluation. Because smart grids are
critical and valuable fundamental infrastructures, it is un-
realistic to test new security countermeasures (including
solutions, schemes, etc.) in real smart grids. Such tests (or
evaluations) may incur fatal errors, causing the smart grid
to be in an unstable state (even out of service). Therefore,
a realistic testbed is a wise choice, which is jointly con-
structed and used by researchers and stakeholders.
• Code security should be strongly concerned in all
blockchain‐related systems. Apart from studying the
security of consensus mechanisms and smart contract,
researchers and software engineers should also study code
security because vulnerable codes can be utilized by
attackers, resulting in financial loss (e.g. DAO attack).
More validating and simulating tools should be developed
to test the codes in different smart contracts and can be
applied to different test techniques for software security
(e.g. fault injection, fuzzing, symbolic execution, sandbox,
static analysis, etc). As a result, more and more severe
vulnerabilities in smart contracts can be avoided before
such smart contracts are released to the public.
In a nutshell, when discussing the security of consensus
mechanism, we should not only consider the threats to
consensus mechanisms themselves but also the threats to both
the carrier (smart contract) and the running environment
(EVM). In the smart grid sector and many other non‐
cryptocurrency sectors, there are no standards (or any best
practice) to guide companies to deploy secure blockchain‐based
systems. Even in the cryptocurrency area, the related standards
and standard operation procedures (SOPs) are still unclear (in
developing). Otherwise, there would not be this many cases of
cryptocurrencies being stolen on different cryptocurrency
trading platforms [200]. In our view, in non‐cryptocurrency
areas, building up security standards (e.g., PKI) and normal-
izing code writing (smart contracts) for blockchain‐based ap-
plications should be considered as the top priority.
6 | CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORKS
Here, we comprehensively study the consensus mechanism of
blockchain technology applied in the energy sector. We first
introduce the basic terms related to blockchain technology and
its general applications. We pay special attention to the appli-
cation of a blockchain‐enabled system in the energy sector,
where the overall structure and principals are presented. Next,
state‐of‐the‐art consensus mechanisms are reviewed and the
corresponding use cases are presented. We can see the obvious
trend of the consensus protocol design in the blockchain
system, where the use case with a large number of participants
chooses a consensus mechanism with high scalability, such as
PoW. Moreover, the use cases that use stricter user access
prefer PBFT or PoA because the user's identity is easy to be
checked. The choice of consensus mechanism relies on the
trade‐off between transaction cost and throughput, scalability
and latency, privacy and decentralization, energy waste and
security. A security analysis demonstrates that collusion attack
and sybil attack can influence the consensus accuracy of1https://blog.openzeppelin.com/on‐the‐parity‐wallet‐multisig‐hack‐405a8c12e8f7/
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Probabilistic distribution: [170] Pros: This early warning system can detect DoS attacks in the network stream before the
stream arrives at the central controller. Therefore, this method allows the central
controller of the smart grid to react to DoS attacks in advance.
Cons: The study only considers DoS attacks; only simulations.
Black list: [171] Pros: Black and white list to monitor all log‐in actions.
Cons: Only framework, no concrete algorithm or solution.
Intermediation compromise Authentication: [145, 172, 173] Pros: Authenticate devices with methods of public key cryptography; good scalability for
multicast network; resistance of different attacks (e.g. man‐in‐the‐middle and DoS).
Cons: Significant message delay; high communication cost; no practical test in smart
grids.
Encrypted aggregation: [174, 175] Pros: Homomorphic encryption to provide confidentiality and integrity for transmitted
data.
Cons: Very high computational cost; feasibility and scalability are not tested.
Intrusion by unknown
nodes
Improved route protocol: [176, 177] Pros: Scalable and efficient; resilient multicast; safeguard to spoofing, DoS and many
others attacks.
Cons: Communication overhead is not validated; lack of detailed security analysis and
test in real smart grids.
Authentication: [177, 178] Pros: Direct and efficient approach to prevent unknown nodes; confidentiality and
integrity of data packets; identification management.
Cons: Lack of real use cases to evaluate actual security of these schemes.
Neural network: [179] Pros: The statistical method is quite efficient after completed training; intrusion
prediction and detection.
Cons: Training is time‐consuming for real use; no real application to evaluate the actual
false positive rate (FPR).
DoS Routing strategy: [180, 181] Pros: Dynamic routing; neighbour supervision; malicious routing detection.
Cons: Larger packet size; delay of establishing connections; lack of evaluation on
testbeds.
Transport layer security: [182–184] Pros: Secure communication channels; confidentiality and integrity of data; resist replay
attack and tampering simultaneously.
Cons: High cost for deploying such protocols; high time consumption for establishing
secure channels; lack of security test in real systems.
Dynamic status control: [185, 186] Pros: High‐efficient optimization methods; reduce the magnitude and duration of service
disruption caused by DoS; earlier DoS prediction; enhanced stability and resiliency of
smart grids.
Cons: High grid fluctuation; high communication overhead in central controllers; FPR
should be considered in real use cases.
Weak credential Authentication with encryption: [187–
189]
Pros: Hybrid security methods are secure against tampering and forgery; identity
validation; data confidentiality.
Cons: Incremental cost for computation and communication in smart grids; weak
security analysis; lack of practical evaluations.
Eavesdropping Encryption: [190–192] Pros: Data confidentiality; tampering detection; friendly data aggregation.
Cons: Homomorphic encryption for data aggregation is not practical as it is quite time‐
costing in computation; DoS and replay attack is not fully considered; performance
and security analysis are not conducted on testbeds (or in real use).
Access control: [193–196] Pros: Data integrity; identity management; protect against eavesdropping, DoS attack,
manipulation, replay attack, etc.; can be combined with encryption methods to form
holistic security solution.
Cons: High computational complexity and communication cost; lack of concrete security
analysis or privacy policies; practical performance is not examined.
(Continues)
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different consensus mechanisms, especially the consensus ac-
curacy of Ripple. On the other hand, the numerous vulnera-
bilities due to man‐made faults in the blockchain environment
can lead to vulnerable consensus mechanisms.
This work focusses on a deeper understanding of the
consensus mechanism in the energy sector to boost the
development of smart grid management systems. However, the
current consensus mechanism might not be able to fully
implement all the requirements from its use case. A customized
consensus mechanism should be designed to better adapt to
more complicated and efficient energy grid operations in the
future. And the customized consensus mechanism can be
deployed and tested on the platform with a governance
structure by giving special permissions. For blockchain‐based
platforms in smart grids, the development of security stan-
dards and the normalization of the smart contract’s code
should be given priority. Besides, the security of the system
relies on secure data transmission and management, which can
improve data encryption in the network layer and the
authentication mechanisms for user identity validation.
Combining with user identification and access priorities will
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